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Bounds in Bank Regulation
Sung Eun (Summer) Kim 1
In his recent essay, Bounded Institutions, 2 Yair Listokin examines bounded and unbounded structures
as two alternative designs for principals to delegate regulatory authority to their agents.3 Bounds refer to
numerical or quantifiable limitations that are set by the principal on some dimension of the agent’s decisionmaking process, and include caps, quotas or grading curves. 4 Listokin shows that bounds can be used to
reach ideal regulatory outcomes even in cases where the principal is uninformed and the agent is biased.
In this Response, I extend the logic and intuition of Listokin’s bounded institutions to banking, an area
where information gaps and biases are pervasive yet bounded structures are not prevalent. For instance, in
the debate about the right size of financial institutions, while there is consensus that a certain number of
financial institutions have become too big (and thus too-big-to-fail), there is much that remains to be agreed
regarding the right size of such institutions and how that ideal should be reached. Likewise, while there is
broad recognition that there are accuracy and accountability issues in the ratings process of financial
institutions, how this regulatory ratings process can be improved and how progress can be measured are
open questions that are being debated.
I suggest here that the numerical and quantifiable feature of bounds such as quotas and curves can offer
a concrete solution to both of these and other regulatory puzzles in banking. I make the argument that more
bounds can and should be used in bank regulation, first, by showing that the banking environment satisfies
the theoretical conditions for bounded structures, and second, by examining the ways in which the special
features of bounds can help solve the urgent challenges in bank regulation.
I.

How Do Bounded Institutions Work in Banking?

This Part provides the basic framework. Who are the relevant actors? In Listokin’s model, there is a
superior body (the principal, or P), a subordinate body (the agent, or A), and the regulated subjects (or S)
who are affected by the principal and agent’s decisions. 5 The principal relies on the agent to observe and
allocate benefits to the subjects according to the quality of the subjects. In banking, Congress enacted the
National Bank Act and the National Currency Act in 1863, the former to create a new class of national
banks and the latter to form the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which was charged with
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Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law. Email: skim@law.uci.edu. I am grateful
to Michele Goodwin and to Arden Rowell for helpful discussions; to Lisa Junghahn and Jackie Woodside of the
University of California, Irvine, Law Library and to Kate Poorbaugh for research assistance; to Joe Masterman, David
Simins and Mike Clemente of the Yale Law Journal for editorial assistance; and to Yair Listokin and the Yale Law
Journal for this opportunity and forum to engage in these discussions.
2
Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE L.J. 336 (2014).
3
The terms ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ are used herein to refer to the principal-agent relationship that arises when one
person (the ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (its ‘agent’) acting on the principal’s behalf and subject to
the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents to such an arrangement. For a formal
definition of agency, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
4
Bounds are distinguishable from rules in that bounds require agents to compare subjects to each other. Rules, on the
other hand, specify ex ante how agent should regulate subjects based on subject-specific factual characteristics. See
Listokin, supra note 2, at 350-351.
5
Id. at 346 tbl. 1.
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the chartering and supervision of these national banks. 6 Throughout this Response, I will refer to Congress
as the principal, the OCC as its agent, and the national banks supervised by the OCC as the subjects. 7
Congress (P)
OCC (A)
National Banks (S)

Congress (principal or P) enacted the National Bank Act and
the National Currency Act in 1863, which charges the OCC
(agent or A) with the chartering and supervision of national
banks (subjects or S)

The remainder of this Part examines how well the bank regulatory environment fits with the conditions
Listokin identifies as ideal for the use of bounded structures. 8 Listokin recommends the use of bounds when:
(1) there is a large number of subjects, (2) there is little variation among subject quality, (3) the agent is
prone to bias and error, and (4) there are limitations to the practicability of rules. 9
(1) Large number of subjects. By the end of 2014, the OCC oversaw a total of 1,663 financial
institutions, which included 39 large banks, 36 mid-size banks, 1,077 community banks, 49 federal branches,
and 462 federal savings associations. 10 Although the total number of regulated institutions has fluctuated
from year to year, the total assets of the subjects that are regulated by the OCC have grown consistently
over the past ten years (See Table 1). This trend aligns with the overall trend of growth throughout the
financial sector, which has continuously expanded over the past thirty years, whether expressed as the
financial sector’s share of gross domestic product (GDP), the quantity of financial assets, employment, or
average wages. 11

6

This view that regulatory agencies act as agents of Congress has been articulated elsewhere. See e.g., Richard L.
Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1140 (1990)
(“Congress, the principal, delegates certain functions to its agent, the administrative agency, expecting that benefits
will accrue to it through this delegation.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 50-51 (1994) (“The relationship between Congress and an administrative agency might
be accurately characterized in hierarchical terms: Congress acts, as a principal, to control the actions of its agencyagent”).
7
While alternative formulations are possible (for example, the subjects could be bank regulations rather than the
regulated banks, and the agent could be the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Federal Reserve, both of
which also oversee different aspects of banking), I will use the above designation as the basic framework throughout
this Response. The scope of this Response is limited to U.S. federal regulation of banks, and the implications of the
dual (federal and state) banking structure or transnational financial regulation on the bounded institutions construct is
outside of the scope of this Response.
8
For an application of the framework to the National Science Foundation (NSF), see Listokin, supra note 2, at 356361.
9
Id. at 341.
10
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2014 (2014).
11
Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2013).
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Table 1. Number and Size of OCC-regulated banks 12
Year
2005
2010
2014

Number of Institutions
1,933
1,487
1,663

Assets ($trillions)
5.8
8.5
10.9

(2) Little variation among subjects. Non-financial firms can be created for any legal purpose and take
myriad forms. Banks, on the other hand, are limited by statute to one or more of three core banking functions:
receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money. 13 And even among financial firms, banks tend to be
more homogenous. This homogeneity is largely a result of regulatory design. Activity restrictions and other
limitations placed on national banks, together with federal preemption rules meant to ensure uniformity,
make it exceedingly difficult for banks to operate in ways that depart too far from the norm. 14
(3) Agents prone to bias and error. Bias and error have specific meanings in Listokin’s model. Bias
refers to the tendency of an agent to systematically place a higher or lower value on a subject than the
principal would perceive (if it had the opportunity to directly observe the subject’s quality), 15 and error
refers to when the agent allocates more or less to the subject than the principal thinks the subject deserves. 16
Fads in science are one source of bias and error that Listokin discusses in his application of bounded
structures to the National Science Foundation (NSF), which could be analogized to bubbles in finance. 17
Bubbles in finance arise when a particular asset is traded at a price significantly above its intrinsic value,
and are fueled by over-optimistic perceptions of value (bias) of and the disproportionate allocations of
resources (error) to such asset class. For example, the housing bubble that was pointed to as one of the
fundamental causes of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was created as a result of over-optimistic projections
of value in the housing sector, and related regulatory policies and market responses that over-stimulated the
mortgage and mortgage-backed securities markets. 18
Another source of bias in financial regulation are boundary problems, which exist when regulatory
boundaries are drawn according to outdated notions of the risks, activities, and actors that they aim to
regulate. 19 While some boundary problems are inevitable because of the pace of financial innovation and
the intentional efforts of financial institutions to operate outside of regulatory boundaries, others can be
12

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2014 (2014); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2010 at 2 (2010); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2005 at 7 (2005).
13
12 C.F.R § 5.20(e)(1) (2015).
14
Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
677, 678 (1988) (“Federal preemption and uniformity, rather than competition and diversity, are the legal norms in
banking regulation.”).
15
Listokin, supra note 2, at 344
16
Id. at 345
17
For a discussion of financial laws’ inability to prevent bubbles and mitigate destruction after bubbles pop, see ERIK
F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014).
18
See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xv-xxvii (2011).
19
MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 10 (2009) (“There
are two aspects of the boundary problem; the shift of activity to unregulated players; and the use of financial
engineering to enable given capital to support more credit.”)
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attributed to ill-fitting regulatory design. For example, in my most recent work, I have described the ways
in which the traditional institution-based approach to financial regulation has exacerbated regulatory biases
and error (as defined by Listokin) in the regulation of leveraged loans. 20
(4) Limitations on practicability of rules. Listokin explains that bounds are especially useful in settings
where it is difficult to devise rules to guide the agent. 21 Whether or not rule-based guides are feasible depend
on the availability and reliability of proxies. 22 While banking is an area where rule-based policies are widely
used, the reliability of the proxies used to administer rule-based policies has come into question in the
aftermath of the recent financial crisis. 23 Numerous accounts of the financial crisis describe the ways in
which proxies such as the credit scores of borrowers, credit ratings of securitized financial products, and
regulatory assessments of the quality of capital held by eventually failed financial institutions grossly
underrepresented the degree of risk in our financial system. 24 It was such misunderstandings of the
magnitude of risk that catalyzed a crisis for which no one was prepared. 25
More importantly, the key difference between rules and bounds is that rules are indifferent to the
allocation among subjects. 26 Under a rule-based system, so long as a subject satisfies the specified
conditions, its status and treatment are unaffected by the performance of its peers. This feature of rules
makes them less suitable for banking regulation in this post-crisis period where there is renewed focus on
interconnectedness among institutions, and recognition that an understanding of where banks stand in
relation to one another is critically important to systemic risk regulation. 27
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the banking environment satisfies the four theoretical
conditions identified by Listokin as ideal for the application of bounds. Part II of this Response examines
why there are nonetheless so few bounds in banking, given their seeming fit, and Part III goes on to explore
two specific contexts where the promise of bounds in banking could be realized.

20

See Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, Managing Regulatory Blindspots: A Case Study of Leveraged Loans, 32 YALE J. ON
REG. 89, 107-108 (2015) (highlighting the boundary problems in the regulation of leveraged loans).
21
See Listokin, supra note 2, at 364-65. For a discussion of the distinction between bounds and rules as regulatory
strategies, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
22
See Listokin, supra note 2, at 364-65.
23
For instance, the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department and Offices in Europe recently organized a workshop titled “The
Future of Rules-Based Fiscal Policy” to discuss whether the current rules-based approach to guide financial policies
has become “too complex to effectively guide policy makers, and too opaque to anchor expectations and be credible
in the eyes of public opinion?” IMF Fiscal Affairs Department Workshop on “The Future of Rules-Based Fiscal
MONETARY
FUND
(2015),
Policy,”
INT’L
http://www.imf.org/external/region/eur/rr/2015/Agenda_Brussels_042915.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CLF-RZZS].
24
For a survey of this literature, see Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review,
50 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 151 (2012).
25
See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at xv-xxvii (describing red flags that were missed by
regulators in the years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis).
26
See Listokin, supra note 2, at 351.
27
See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating Financial Markets,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 887 (2013); Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262 (2013); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 206 (2008).
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II.

Why Are There So Few Bounds in Banking?

If banking provides a theoretically ideal environment for bounds, one might expect to see bounds being
widely used in bank regulation. However, much of bank regulation is presently rules-based. 28 Listokin
explains that there are some areas where bounded structures are not workable because of the idiosyncratic
or unexpected nature of the regulated subjects’ needs. 29 One such example is regulation that deals with
large-scale and rare disasters (such as catastrophic hurricanes) where the inability of bounds to flexibly
adapt to variations could actually lead to bad outcomes. Another is defense spending, which is expensive
and less predictable and where the transaction costs of passing additional bills are high. 30 Should banking
also be added to this short list of sectors that are incompatible with bounds? In this Part, I explore some
possible explanations for the scarcity of bounds in banking but also refute the notion that such explanations
preclude the use of bounds in banking altogether.
Agent independence. One structural feature of bank regulation that could make implementing bounds
more challenging is the fact that the agencies that regulate financial institutions are independent agencies. 31
The OCC is organized as an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of Treasury, and does not receive
any appropriations from Congress. 32 In 2014, about 97% of the OCC’s operations was funded by
semiannual assessments levied on national banks and federal savings associations, with the remainder
coming from the OCC’s investments and other income. 33 This structural feature of the OCC could limit the
efficacy of bounds if it means that the principal lacks the authority to constrain, including through the use
of bounds, its agent.
However, the independent and self-funded status of the OCC does not mean that it is insulated from
any congressional control. Congress could exercise control over and implement bounds on the OCC by
exercising its power to (i) amend the National Bank Act, (ii) request evaluations, investigations, and audits
via the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and (iii) set the scope and standard of judicial review of
agency actions. 34 And Listokin makes clear that bounds encompass more than just presidential oversight
and congressional appropriations; they include other avenues of control such as regulatory budgets,
resource constraints, and even cost-benefit analysis. 35 Cost-benefit analysis in particular has taken an
expanded role in many areas of financial regulation. 36
28

See e.g., Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 273, 282 (2011) (referring to the “historically predominant rules-based approaches toward financial
regulation”); John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381,
381 (2008) (explaining how U.S. financial regulation is rules-based).
29
Listokin, supra note 2, at 341-342 and 378-79.
30
Id. at 378-79.
31
For a discussion of how regulators of financial institutions are independent agencies that are also exempt from
congressional appropriations, see Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment:
The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1823 n.12 (2012).
32
About the OCC, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/indexabout.html [http://perma.cc/Z5L8-HV72].
33
FY 2016 Budget-in-Brief: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (2015),
http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/budget-inbrief/Documents/22.%20OCC%20FY%202016%20BIB%20Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/7NHD-GX2R].
34
For a discussion of each such powers, see §§ 7:21, 7:24, 12.10 of 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE (3d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2015).
35
Listokin, supra note 2, at 368-69.
36
Cf. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE
L.J. 882 (2015) (describing the challenges to cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation). Following the
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Type of risk. Another characteristic of banking that could explain the absence of bounds is the type of
risks that pervade the banking sector. Bank regulation, like hurricane regulation, also protects against
infrequent and destructive events. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s account of the past eight hundred
years of banking crises has confirmed the inevitability and cyclicality of such large-scale crises. 37
But financial crises, unlike floods or earthquakes and other force majeure events, are human-made and
thus are theoretically preventable, or at least controllable. And much of bank regulation is also about the
ordinary course of banking, such as regulating entry and exit, defining the scope of permissible activities,
and the supervision of the management and information systems used to monitor risk. Recognizing that the
nature of banking risks ranges from the extraordinary to ordinary, 38 bounds could selectively be applied to
the kinds of risks and decisions that fluctuate less from year to year.
Information gaps. Another possible explanation for why bounds are infrequently used is the information
asymmetry or gap between what is known by the principal versus what is known by the agent with respect
to the quality of the subjects. 39 As Listokin explains: “when the principal has more uncertainty regarding
the distribution of quality within the population, bounded institutions become less attractive relative to
unbounded institutions.” 40 In the context of banking, Roberta Romano has written about the challenges of
financial regulators who must regulate in the face of unavailability of key information, a dynamically
changing environment, and uncertainty. 41 Under such conditions, how can Congress intelligently set
bounds to constrain the OCC if it does not have any superior information with respect to the quality of the
regulated subjects?
While no crystal ball exists, records of past information and the benefit of hindsight are available to
Congress, and it is this history and backlog of information that is needed to set and test bounds in bank
regulation. And to the extent there are gaps in Congress’s knowledge, the use of bounds can be one way to
actually force information from both the regulated banks and bank regulators up to Congress so that it can
set the proper bounds. 42 Furthermore, the information required to design bounds in bank regulation comes
from not only the agents and subject banks, but also from the debt and equity markets (such as stock prices,
trading volume, and default frequencies) that have also been shown to be accurate predictors of bank

publication of Coates’ article, the Yale Law Journal Forum published a collection of responses (and Coates’ reply
thereto). This collection of writings is available at 124 YALE L.J. F. 246, 246-315 (2015).
37
CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY
(2009). For a discussion of how to legitimize bailouts in light of their inevitability, see Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011).
38
For a survey of the principal supervisory strategies used by financial regulators to regulate risks, see Howell E.
Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 319, 339-63 (1999).
39
See Listokin, supra note 2, at 362.
40
Id.
41
Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
REGULATION (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012).
42
One recent example of such consensus building is the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS)’s
recently held public hearings on the regulation of virtual currencies that were held in January 2014, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZW7R7FPIJY,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4_M736FgdY,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6EPzoxTAcAI,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Z3-DA7aFCU,
and
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poMdKtU9aRk. Following the January 2014 hearings, NYDFS released its
proposed “BitLicense” regulatory framework for New York virtual currency businesses, available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171-vc.pdf (a further revised version of the regulations were released
in February 2015 and are available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/revised_vc_regulation.pdf).
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failures and successes. 43 And the newly created Office of Financial Research (OFR) was formed
specifically for the purpose of gathering and disseminating information that can be used as regulatory inputs
in the design and implementation of bounds. 44
III.

What Might Bounds Look Like in Banking?

Comparing banking data and trends with Listokin’s model in Part I suggests that banks could be fertile
ground for the use of bounds. And the discussion in Part II demonstrates that while barriers exist, they are
not insurmountable. This last Part offers a preliminary sketch of what bounds might look like in banking
regulation by offering two examples. The first is a statutorily set quota on the chartering authority of the
OCC and the second is a statutorily set curve on the ratings of OCC-supervised banks. I first describe the
institutional setting for each, then discuss the strengths of using bounds to address the acute problems in
that particular setting. I will also address possible counterarguments.
A. Bounds and the Issuance of National Bank Charters
In this sub-Part, I discuss the possible use of bounds in the administration of one of the main levers of
bank regulation: the OCC’s licensing function. No entity in the United States can operate as a national bank
without an OCC-approved charter. 45 And unlike with corporate charters where the role of the secretary of
state is purely ministerial, the role of the regulator in reviewing and granting of applications is much more
than ministerial. 46 A positive or negative outcome of a charter application depends on whether the OCC
finds that there is a “reasonable chance that the bank will succeed and that [it] will be operated in a safe and
sound manner.” 47 If a charter application fails, the applicant may bring a judicial challenge, but the standard
of review in that case is the most deferential standard, which asks whether the OCC’s decision was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 48
This gatekeeping function of the OCC has created a circularity problem in the later stages of the bank
regulatory cycle: the regulator who initially determines that a bank is likely to be successful at the licensing
stage also is tasked with the decision of whether or not to close that same bank in the event of its distress.
The dynamics of self-preservation and blame avoidance may lead the regulator to become invested in the
subjects’ success and display a tendency to “oversave” the banks it oversees. 49 In addition, the fact that
almost all of the OCC’s budget comes from the assessments and fees collected from supervised institutions
raises a conflict of interest in the chartering process by incentivizing the agent to grant more charters than
may otherwise be optimal (“overbank”).

43

For a survey of the academic literature and an account of bank regulators’ efforts to incorporate market signals into
bank supervision, see Timothy J. Curry et al., Using Market Information to Help Identify Distressed Institutions: A
Regulatory Perspective, 15 FDIC BANKING REV., no. 3, 2003, at 1.
44
About the OFR, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, http://financialresearch.gov/about/ [http://perma.cc/5NWMGBZ9].
45
12 C.F.R. § 5.20(b) (2015) (describing licensing requirements).
46
Cf. MODEL BUS. CORP.ACT § 1.25(d) (2010) (describing the secretary of state’s filing of the corporate charter as a
ministerial task.)
47
12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f) (2015).
48
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curium).
49
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial
Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 915-16 (2011) (describing the conflict of interest between supervisory duties and
budgetary concerns arising from the funding structure).
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Bounds could provide a solution to the problems of overbanking and oversaving in the bank chartering
process. A statutorily set quota 50 could act as an upper bound on the presently quantitatively unfettered
discretion of the OCC in this decision to open banks. Congress would still rely on the OCC’s expertise to
determine whether an applicant deserves a charter (or a receiver should be appointed), but could protect
against any tendencies of the agent to oversave or overbank by using bounds to limit the size and
crowdedness of the sector. 51
The strength of bounds such as the quota contemplated here is that they force these discussions to
happen ex ante and create a binding mechanism that will not be eroded by the problems of circularity and
conflict of interests in bank regulation. However, implementing bounds does not come without costs. A
quota, if reached, will keep any and all entrants out, regardless of their desert or merit. And if a prospective
entrant is kept out because there are no longer any seats left at the table, we might be worried about two
separate problems. Not only is this an unfair result for the applicant, but it could also cause those who
already have a seat at the now-full table to become complacent. However, a quota is meant to force the
agent to face these kinds of difficult scenarios, which prioritize systemic considerations above individual
institutional concerns, and evaluate fairness from the perspective of the entire banking sector and not just
from that of the prospective entrant or incumbent. Moreover, regulating entry is easier and less costly than
ex post intervention in a crowded, overheated banking market. 52 Furthermore, banking is a dynamic
industry, where there are multiple forced and natural departures, creating frequent opportunities for new
entrants to enter the banking industry by assuming a closed bank’s deposits. 53
But, what if the quota is too high? Too low? Or impossible to change when it needs to be updated?
These questions about the appropriate level and administration of a quota go to an assessment of the “right
size” of the banking sector that will have to be answered whether or not we have bounds. 54 And once a
consensus regarding these open questions has been reached, bounds-based regulations will be an effective
way to credibly commit to the agreed upon limits.
B. Bounds and Regulatory Ratings
In this sub-Part, I discuss the possible use of bounds in the OCC’s regulatory ratings system. While
much attention has been paid to credit ratings agencies (CRAs) and how to fix the broken pieces of that
50

The constitutionality of Congress’ power to charter national banks (as within its power to regulate interstate
commerce) was upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
51
The Federal Reserve Board’s recently finalized rule limiting bank mergers or acquisitions if the liabilities of the
combined entity will exceed more than 10% of the liabilities in the financial system is a move in this direction. The
final rule (also referred to as Regulation XX or the “Concentration Limit on Large Financial Companies”) was
issued by the Federal Reserve Board on November 4, 2015 to implement section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-11-14/html/201426747.htm.
52
Not only are more examinations conducted as part of the licensing process, the OCC has also made clear that de
novo banks are more intensively monitored and closely supervised. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK
SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, 11-12 (September 2007, last updated October 2014)
[hereinafter COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK].
53
The OCC grants a shelf charter to prospective acquirers for this specific purpose.
54
See generally Gary H. Stern & Ron Feldman, Addressing TBTF by Shrinking Financial Institutions: An Initial
RESERVE
BANK
OF
MINNEAPOLIS:
THE
REGION
(June
1,
2009),
Assessment,
FED.
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/addressing-tbtf-by-shrinking-institutions-an-initialassessment [http://perma.cc/JD3D-4PLU]; Mark J. Flannery, What To Do About TBTF?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATL.
2010 FIN. MARKETS CONF.: UP FROM THE ASHES: THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AFTER THE CRISIS (May 12, 2010),
https://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/10fmc_flannery.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3B2-3J2D].
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regime, 55 not as much has been written about the rating that regulators give to supervised banks.
Considering that the prescriptions and reform proposals from the CRA critique involve shifting much of
the work that was previously done by CRAs to the regulators, the time is now ripe to turn our attention to
the regulatory ratings process. 56
To provide a brief introduction, the OCC uses a “uniform interagency rating system[]” that has been
jointly adopted by federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies to assign ratings to subjects. 57 The CAMELS
rating, as it is also known, is a composite of six component assessments: capital adequacy, asset quality,
management capability, earnings quality, liquidity adequacy, and sensitivity to market risk. 58 For each
component of CAMELS, the subject is given a rating ranging from one to five, with a one rating indicating
the strongest performance and a five being the weakest. 59
The ratings process can best be described as one that is customized to the institution. It takes into
account each institution’s size and sophistication, the nature and complexity of its activities, and its risk
profile. 60 Further, bank supervision responsibilities are assigned on a bank-by-bank basis, with a dedicated
commissioned national bank examiner assigned to each examined bank (on a rotation basis). 61
While this regulatory philosophy and approach that values consistency and continuity within each
subject is important to ensure that the supervisory process identifies risks and deficiencies that are unique
to an institution, it raises two concerns: one is the lack of comparability of ratings between subjects and
second is the potential for ratings inflation. A bank given a rating of one will have no way of knowing
where it stands in relation to its peers because it does not know how many one ratings were given (in the
extreme case, all banks could have received the same rating). Unlike chartering decisions, which are made
public, bank regulatory ratings are not disclosed. They are known only to the regulator and the senior
management of the rated bank. And if regulators over time develop a positive bias towards subjects (also
referred to as ‘regulatory capture’ 62), banks may be given a higher rating than the principal would deem
appropriate, leading to inflation.
Bounds could provide a solution to the comparability and inflation concerns. In this case, the use of a
curve would be appropriate. First, the beauty of a curve is that it forces the agent to compare subjects to
one another. A statutorily set ratings curve would require the OCC to consider all rated subjects before
determining the ratings assignments. And a curve, by definition, avoids ratings inflation (or deflation for
55

See, e.g., Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB.
POL’Y 253 (2010); Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating Industry, 108 NW. U.
L. REV. 85 (2013).
56
For a summary of the sections of the Dodd-Frank Act that require that references to credit ratings be removed from
statute and regulation, see BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY 15-17 (2010).
57
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 9.
58
Id.
59
A detailed description of each of the component ratings, including a list of principal evaluation factors as well as a
description of each numerical rating for each component, can be found in the Comptroller’s Handbook of the bank
supervision process. Id. at 46-54.
60
Id. at 9.
61
Id. at 5 (“Personnel selected for these assignments are rotated periodically to ensure that their supervisory
perspective remains objective.”).
62
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. MGM’T SCI. 335, 335-36 (1974)
(explaining the theory of regulatory capture); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
3, 4 (1971).

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695161

DRAFT (forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal Forum)
that matter). The implementation of a curve would also shed some light on an otherwise opaque practice.
The presence and disclosure of a curve can help banks understand where they stand relative to their peers
without the need to know the specific ratings assigned to competitor banks.
Ranking institutions of various size, geography, risk appetite, etc., according to a single cohesive
standard is difficult and complex, and requires inevitable judgment calls. 63 Notwithstanding such
challenges, the benefit of a bound such as a curve (and the planning and design required to implement such
a bound) is that it can manage the biases and errors of regulators. Furthermore, the regulatory structure
within the OCC is already set up as a pyramid structure (portfolio managers report to the examiner-incharge who then reports to the supervisory office), which lends itself to a process where ratings decisions
are made by a centralized supervisory body within the agent. Such an effort to centralize would also be
consistent with the OCC’s commitment to identifying and measuring risk using common definitions and
common methods of evaluation. 64 Lastly, the regulatory ratings procedure is not intended to replace banks’
internal models of risk and private ratings organizations’ efforts to generate and maintain tailored and
sophisticated measures of risk.
Another challenge to using a curve is its bluntness. For instance, a bank may have scored worse than
its peers but only by a small margin—and a curve may result in a ratings differential that overstates that
small margin. This concern is especially compelling given my earlier assessment above of the banking
sector as one with relative little variability. However, it is precisely this kind of resistance to treating banks
adversely that has overheated the finance sector.
One consensus that has emerged from the post-crisis legal and finance literature is the need for
countercyclical regulation. Countercyclical regulation refers to policies that clamp down during boom
periods and loosen up during bust periods. 65 Countercyclical regulation has two main objectives: the first
is to prevent the growth of asset bubbles and the second is to require financial institutions to build up
reserves when times are good. 66 Bounds can be used to carry out both those objectives. First, as the national
bank charter quota example shows, bounds can counteract regulatory inertia toward overbanking by
imposing limits on the OCC’s chartering authority even during times when there are no obvious or urgent
deficiencies in the banking sector. Second, as the relative regulatory ratings curve example shows, bounds
can be used to recognize and reward top performers who outperform their peers (and penalize laggards)
and to facilitate a race to the top among subjects.
Conclusion
As Listokin articulates in Bounded Institutions, the promise of bounds is that they can be used to reach
ideal outcomes even when the principal is uninformed and the agent is biased. This has immense appeal for
banking, where information gaps and biases are pervasive. Another advantage of bounds for bank regulation
is that they force comparisons among subjects, which is useful for systemic risk regulation. Bounds can

63

The Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) (https://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm) developed by the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) which publishes peer group average data on banks’ performance
and balance-sheet composition data since 2003 can be a useful guide in setting the curve and overcoming some of the
practical challenges of implementing such a curve.
64
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 19.
65
On the other hand, pro-cyclical regulation refers to policies that clamp down during bust periods and loosen up
during boom periods. For a review of ongoing debate over the objectives, tools, and impediments to countercyclical
regulation, see Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and its Challenges, BOS. COLL. LAW SCH. DIGITAL
COMMONS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/934/ [http://perma.cc/RPF2-5JXA].
66
Id. at 2.
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also be used as a means to credibly commit to countercyclical measures that have recently been proposed
as an antidote to bubbles in finance.
While I show in this Response that the banking environment is a theoretically appealing setting for
bounds, some additional conditions must also be fulfilled for the successful design and implementation of
bounds in bank regulation. They include the availability of comprehensive and quality data regarding the
regulated subjects and the principal and agent’s willingness to consider new regulatory strategies.
Furthermore, it must be recognized that the regulated subjects are not static participants, and the subjects’
anticipated response to bounds must be built into the design of the bounds in order for bounded structures
to reach their desired outcomes. As such, the knowability of the quality and behaviors of the regulated
subjects by the principal and agent as well as the alignment of goals among principal, agent and the
regulated subjects are important prerequisites for the realization of the promise of bounds in bank regulation.
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